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Introduction 
When joint venture (“JV”) parents come together with a business idea, they 
expect to develop the resulting intellectual property (“IP”) to the benefit of all parents.  
The joint venture agreement (“JVA”) is crucial to the formation and operation of the IP 
JV.  Careful drafting will account for the parties’ expectations regarding the parents’ and 
the JV’s IP.  However, the parties should realize that the JVA is also crucial to the 
termination of the JV.  The JV parents must accept the reality that all JVs must come to 
an end, and some JVs will come to an end sooner than one of the parties might have 
wished.  Therefore, parties to the JVA should devise a plan for termination in advance.   
JVA’s generally address the termination stage of the JV.  However, JV parents 
must draft the termination clause and the entire agreement with an eye towards hostile 
termination—when one parent may want to continue the JV whereas the other parent may 
want to terminate the JVA.  Parents must draft the JVA specifically to account for the 
contingencies of breach of the JVA, business problems, or insufficient revenue.  If the 
parties do not address changed circumstances or expectations in their JVA, the courts will 
interpret the agreement according to established contract interpretation principles.  
However, this may not lead to the best disposition of the IP involved.   
 
  
                                                
 
I. Drafting the Joint Venture Agreement  
 
Joint venturers must draft the JVA to prevent termination yet also to account for 
withdrawal.  The JVA can address issues such as conflict-resolution and governance with 
an aim of promoting either coordination or flexibility.  “There are three theoretical 
contracting modes associated with [JV’s]:  classical, neoclassical, and relational.”1  
Classical contracts maximize “coordination at the expense of flexibility.”2  Their scope is 
limited to an individual transaction, and they are “presentiated”—that is, they “fix at the 
time of contracting precise expectations for future performance and the remedies 
available in the event of breach.”3  Neoclassical contracts incorporate governance 
structures rather than being completely presentiated.4  Relational contracts are “the most 
flexible, emphasizing organic development of collaboration in response to changes in 
business climate.”5  Relational contracts are receptive to modification rather than 
specifying expectations on the front end.6   
Relational contracts best serve the purpose of preventing termination.  Rather than 
encompassing only an individual transaction, relational contracts allow for growth of the 
JV and expansion into new markets.  Their flexibility allows the parties to respond to 
changes in expectations or circumstances while still being governed by the JVA, rather 
 
1 Steven R. Salbu & Richard A. Brahm, Strategic Considerations in 
Designing Joint Venture Contracts, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 253, 255 
(1992). 
2 Id. at 256. 
3 Id. at 255-256. 
4 Id. at 256. 
5 Id. 
6 See id. 
  
than compelling termination.  However, the parties must account for withdrawal in the 
JVA, and the best way to do that is to coordinate withdrawal in advance by presentiation. 
A. Drafting to Prevent Termination   
 
Joint venturers can ensure performance of commitments and increase compliance 
with contractual terms by including incentive schemes.  Collaborative incentives are 
contractual mechanisms such as “reciprocal penalties,” “rewards for altruism,” and 
“bundling of commitments.”7  A reciprocal penalty “exacts a charge upon the violating 
partner equivalent to its transgression.”8  Such a charge reduces the likelihood that a 
parent will cause damage to the other parent.  The opposite is a reward for altruism which 
rewards a parent for conferring a benefit either on the other parent or on the JV.9  Such a 
reward increases the incidence of the desirable behavior.  Bundling of commitments can 
be a way of implementing penalties and rewards.10  “Bundling provisions in the [JVA] tie 
various commitments into a web of contingency.  Duties of parent A become triggered by 
the occurrence of an act by parent B, or else parent A is relieved of a duty by virtue of 
nonperformance on the part of parent B.”11  These collaborative incentives contribute to 
the flexibility of relational contracts which prevents termination. 
B. Drafting to Account for Withdrawal 
Joint venturers must provide for the withdrawal of any party to the JVA.  “There 
is no point pegging partners down irrevocably because those who wish to leave the [JV] 
                                                 
7 See id. at 298-302. 
8 Id. at 299. 
9 See id. at 300. 
10 See id. at 301. 
11 Id. 
  
                                                
will procure reasons . . . even seeking a solution in litigation.”12  Because of the 
possibility that a parent will leave the JV, the parents must decide in advance how much 
market freedom they will have after a party leaves the JV and they are no longer 
partners.13  The JV parents must regulate competition, or the lack thereof, territories, 
products, and distributors before a party withdraws.14  The parties to the JVA should also 
decide what will happen to ancillary contracts, such as licenses, and to intellectual 
property. Presentiated contracts that coordinate withdrawal in advance are the best way 
for joint venturers to account for withdrawal. 
II. Levels of Termination 
When conflicts arise between parties to a JVA, the parents have a choice of 
outcomes that ranges from amendment of the JVA, to rescission of the JVA, to 
termination of the JVA, to termination of the JV.  Amendment or rescissions of the JVA 
are less severe than actual termination of the JVA or the JV.  Rescission and termination 
of the JVA can be distinguished by the terms of the contract.  Rescission may either be a 
unilateral unmaking of a contract or a mutual agreement to discharge contractual duties, 
but termination “refers to the discharge of duties by the exercise of a power granted by 
the agreement.”15  When the JVA is terminated, the JV may still continue, and certain 
contractual obligations may continue as well.16  Termination of the JV is an extreme 
 
12 RONALD CHARLES WOLF, EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURE MANAGEMENT: PRACTICAL 
LEGAL INSIGHTS FOR SUCCESSFUL ORGANIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 234 (2000). 
13 See id. at 444. 
14 See id. 
15 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1308 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis added)(citing 
CALAMARI, JOHN D. & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 21-22, at 854-65 
(3d ed. 1987)). 
16 See WOLF, supra note 12, at 444-45 (describing the continuation of 
collateral contracts upon termination of the JVA).  In addition to 
  
                                                                                                                                                
outcome, but it is rarely the subject of litigation.  Termination of the JV by its nature 
means that neither party wants to continue the JV, which is a meeting of the minds and 
not a conflict.  Of these various possibilities, termination of the JVA is the most common 
outcome when conflicts arise and is the most common subject of litigation.   
III. Termination of the Joint Venture Agreement 
 
There are many reasons for termination of a JVA:  failure of a pre-closing 
condition; expiration of the term of the JVA; one of the parties goes into bankruptcy; 
there is a change of control of one of the partners; expropriation of the JV’s assets in an 
international JV; business objectives or goals are not reached; income or revenue is not 
generated; force majeur; deadlock; one parent breached the JVA; or the JV breached the 
JVA.17  More than one of these events may occur simultaneously.  A party might 
terminate a JVA because the JV is breaching the JVA, but the terminating party is 
materially breaching the JVA as well.  Or, a party might terminate a JVA because of 
failure of the JV to generate revenue, but this early termination of a JVA may itself be a 
breach of the JVA. 
The reasons for termination that are most likely to result in litigation are that a 
parent or the JV breached the JVA, the parties did not reach business objectives or goals 
or had business problems, or insufficient income or revenue was generated.  Litigation 
concerning break-up of joint ventures tends to be very complicated, involving numerous 
plaintiffs, defendants, contracts, and claims.  The non-terminating party or parties will 
 
continuation of other contracts, some clauses of the JVA will survive 
termination of the agreement.  Id. 
17 See id. at 439-42; Michael E. Hooton, Structuring and Negotiating 
International Joint Ventures, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1013, 1028 (1994). 
  
bring claims such as breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, failure to transfer 
business, competition with the JV (which could be a breach of contract or a fiduciary 
duty claim), and third-party beneficiary claims.  Sometimes the terminating party will 
bring counterclaims for the reasons that led to its termination of the JVA.  Often there are 
allegations that the reasons for termination are a pretext for the terminating party’s desire 
to sponsor a different venture or conduct business with a different partner.     
A. Termination Due to Breach of the Joint Venture Agreement
In Arrowroot Natural Pharmacy v. Standard Homeopathic Co., one of the JV 
parents, Standard Homeopathic Company (“Standard”), gave notice of intent to terminate 
the JVA if the JV did not cure its alleged breaches of the JVA.18  Standard and the other 
JV parent, Arrowroot Natural Pharmacy (“Arrowroot Pharmacy”), had formed a JV, 
incorporated as Arrowroot Standard Direct (“Arrowroot Standard”), with Arrowroot 
Pharmacy owning 667 of the outstanding shares of stock and Standard owning the 
remaining 333 shares.19  Parent Standard granted the JV Arrowroot Standard “exclusive 
rights and privileges regarding the sale of certain homeopathic drugs.”20  Arrowroot 
Standard would sell homeopathic products manufactured by Standard in specific markets 
within the United States, in particular the “Professional Mail Order” and “Retail Mail 
Order” classes of trade, and would compound, sell and distribute extemporaneous items21 
to the “Professional Mail Order,” “Retail Mail Order,” “Pharmacy,” and “Natural Foods” 
                                                 
18 Arrowroot Natural Pharmacy v. Standard Homeopathic Co., No. 96-3934, 
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1327, at  6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 1998). 
19 Id. at 3. 
20 Id. at 1. 
21 “Extemporaneous items are items not manufactured by Standard in bulk 
quantities.  The definition of an ‘extemporaneous product’ as used 
within the homeopathic industry is a product ‘produced in small 
quantity in reaction to an order received that are not intended to be 
stored in a shelf.’”  Id. at 4. 
  
                                                
classes of trade.22  The owner of parent Arrowroot Pharmacy, Joseph Carapico, his wife 
and daughter purchased a building to house the JV operations.  Then they modified it to 
meet state and federal requirements for pharmacy, medical compounding, and storage, 
and they installed a telephone and computer ordering system that integrated the wiring.23  
Since opening the new facility, the Carapicos had invested at least $400,000 into 
Arrowroot Standard.  One month prior to Standard’s letter seeking termination, 
Arrowroot Standard had five or six full-time employees and nine or ten part-time 
employees, not including Mr. Carapico.24
1. Claims 
Arrowroot Standard and Arrowroot Pharmacy sued Standard, seeking monetary 
damages and an injunction precluding Standard from terminating or otherwise violating 
the JVA.25  Plaintiffs 
allege[d] that defendant breached the [Joint Venture] Agreement by not 
turning over orders for extemporaneous products.  In addition, plaintiffs 
allege[d] fraud arising from representations of Standard, and assert[ed] 
Standard’s breach of its duty of good faith as a joint venturer because it 
appropriated for itself, or a wholly owned subsidiary formed for that 
purpose, related business that was the subject of the joint venture.  The 
Amended Complaint also allege[d] the diversion of business by Standard 
for the purpose of harming plaintiffs and to take over the joint venture’s 
business and induce sale of Arrowroot Standard’s facilities at a distress 
price.26
 
22 Id. at 3-4. 
23 Id. at 10. 
24 Id. at 11. 
25 Id. at 6-7 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
26 Id. at 12. 
  
                                                
Standard counterclaimed alleging breach of the JVA and fraud.  In its counterclaim, 
Standard claimed that plaintiffs failed to pay defendant royalties on extemporaneous sales 
and that plaintiffs are indebted to defendant by failing to make timely payments for goods 
received.  Furthermore, Standard alleged that plaintiffs violated the JVA by preparing the 
financial books not in accordance with GAAP and that plaintiffs intended to defraud 
defendant.27
2. Ruling and Reasoning 
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, applying 
Pennsylvania law,28 awarded plaintiffs damages and enjoined the defendant from 
terminating the JVA until plaintiffs were given an opportunity to cure default.29  
Standard’s counterclaims were its bases for terminating the JVA.  The court held entirely 
in favor of the plaintiffs on two of the counterclaims.  The court stated, “defendant has 
not proven that Arrowroot Standard has breached the [JVA] by failing to pay the 
accounts receivable on a timely basis,”30 and “defendant has not established by clear and 
convincing evidence that plaintiffs committed fraud”31 Thus, Standard could not use 
those reasons as justification for terminating the JVA.   
 
27 Id. at 25-30. 
28 See id. at 30. 
29 See id. at 44-45.  Paragraph 7.01(a)(1) of the JVA provides that 
Standard and Arrowroot Standard may terminate the JVA “if any of the 
following events occur:   
“Breach or default by either party of any of the terms, 
obligations, covenants, under this Agreement which is not waived in 
writing by the affected non-breaching party.  In such case the non-
breaching party shall notify the breaching party of such alleged breach 
and the breaching party shall have a period of thirty (30) days to cure 
same.”  Id. at 5. 
30 Id. at 38. 
31 Id. at 45. 
  
                                                
On defendant’s royalties counterclaim, the court held that Arrowroot Standard 
owed Standard royalties pursuant to the JVA for the sales of extemporaneous products.32  
However, “[t]he failure of Arrowroot Standard to remit royalty payments to Standard for 
sales of extemporaneous products cannot be a basis for termination of the [JVA] at this 
time since Arrowroot Standard was justified in suspending its obligation to pay royalties 
because Standard materially breached the [JVA] by not transferring all of the 
extemporaneous business to Arrowroot Standard.”33   
On defendant’s financial books counterclaim, the court held that “defendant has 
proven that plaintiffs failed to comply with GAAP when it prepared its financial 
statements.”34  Moreover, Standard was entitled to terminate under Paragraph 7.01 of the 
JVA, and the termination clause is enforceable.35  However, the court considered 
principles of equity.  If Standard terminated the JVA, the majority shareholder Arrowroot 
Pharmacy would forfeit its investment in the JV, which amounted to over $400,000.36  
Quoting a Pennsylvania Superior Court case, the court stated, “‘Equity . . . abhors a 
forfeiture and is greatly hesitant to enforce one.’”37  The court used the equitable doctrine 
of substantial performance to prevent the forfeiture.38  The court found that Arrowroot 
Standard’s non-performance of all of the terms of the JVA, including failure to maintain 
 
32 Id. at 36-37. 
33 Id. at 37. 
34 Id. at 38. 
35 See id. at 39-40. 
36 Id. at 40. 
37 Id. (quoting Kalina v. Eckert, 497 A.2d 1384, 1385 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1985)). 
38 See id. at 40-41.  “‘When a party has honestly and faithfully 
preformed all material elements of its obligations under a contract, 
but has failed to fulfill certain technical obligations, causing no 
serious detriment to the injured party, it would be odious and 
inequitable to compel forfeiture of the entire contract.’”  Id. 
(quoting Barraclough v. Atlantic Refining Co. 326 A.2d 477, 480 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1974)). 
  
                                                
financial statements in accordance with GAAP and to pay royalties, was justified by 
Standard’s material breaches of the JVA, which included failure to turn over all 
extemporaneous business39 and to afford Arrowroot Standard the best wholesale price as 
required by the JVA40.41  Standard’s breaches prompted Arrowroot Standard’s refusal to 
pay royalties and to prepare its accounting records in accordance with GAAP.42  “The 
court further [found] that, other than the two instances cited above, Arrowroot Standard 
has substantially performed all of its obligations under the [JVA].”43  The court 
concluded that “defendant cannot terminate the [JVA], at this time.”44  The court enjoined 
defendant from terminating the JVA for a thirty day period, during which time plaintiffs 
were given an opportunity to cure the two defaults alleged by defendant.45
3. Principles 
Arrowroot Natural Pharmacy applied basic contract law principles to decide 
whether to allow termination in response to breach of the JVA.  In summary, if a contract 
allows a party a period to cure default, then the other party cannot terminate.  If one party 
materially breaches a contract and then the other party does not perform, if the non-
 
39 Id. at 41.  On plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim regarding failure 
to transfer extemporaneous business, the court held that “[t]he 
intentional decision of Standard not to transfer all the extemporaneous 
orders required by the [JVA] is a material breach of the Agreement.”  
Id. at 31.  The court awarded plaintiffs $7,300, the amount Arrowroot 
Standard would have received from the sale of extemporaneous items 
withheld by Standard.  Id. at 33. 
40 On plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim regarding the price of 
Standard’s products, “[p]laintiffs have proven that defendant 
materially breached the [JVA] by not giving this discount [equal to the 
price of one item when the purchaser buys a dozen or more quantities of 
the same item] as required by the terms of the Agreement.”  Id. at 36.  
The court awarded plaintiffs $41,520 on this claim.  Id. 
41 See id. at 41-42. 
42 Id. at 42. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 43. 
45 Id. at 44. 
  
performing party was justified in response to the breaching party, then the breaching 
party may not terminate.  If one party substantially performs the contract, then the other 
party cannot terminate. 
B. Termination Due to Business Problems or Failure to Reach Business Goals  
 
The subject of Kindergartners Count, Inc. v. DeMoulin46 is an intellectual 
property partnership that is instructive for intellectual property JVs.  It is well-known that 
“the American legal system treats joint ventures as pseudopartnerships; partnership 
principles are applied to problems or conflicts in joint ventures.”47  In Kindergartners 
Count, Kindergartners Count, Inc. (“KCI”) entered into a Partnership Agreement with 
Telephone Pioneers of America (“TPA”).  KCI, a non-profit exempt organization, was 
the copyright owner of “I Like Me!” (“ILM”), a personalized children’s book, and the 
ILM Teacher’s Guide.48  The purpose of the partnership was to have local units of TPA, a 
domestic fraternal society, work with schools and other interested community groups to 
distribute KCI’s ILM program.49  Additionally, KCI entered into a Consulting Agreement 
with Donald DeMoulin, a professor of education.  Under the agreement, DeMoulin was 
to provide KCI with educational, training, publication, and research consulting services 
as they related to the ILM program;50 he was an independent contractor of KCI;51 and he 
                                                 
46 Kindergartners Count, Inc. v. DeMoulin, No. 00-4173-JAR, No. 01-4017-
JAR, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4212 (D. Kan. Mar. 13, 2003). 
47 Adam B. Weissburg, Note, Reviewing the Law on Joint Ventures with an 
Eye Toward the Future, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 487, 488-89 (1990) (footnote 
omitted). 
48 See Kindergartners Count, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4212 at 6. 
49 See id. 
50 See id. at 9. 
51 See. id. at 11. 
  
                                                
was obligated to “hold in confidence all information obtained in the course of providing 
consulting services.”52
1. Claims 
TPA gave formal notice of intent to terminate the Partnership Agreement to 
KCI.53  TPA’s reasons for terminating the partnership were business problems: 
The production problems, delivery intervals and recent discussion with 
your managers regarding intended price increases have led us to conclude 
that if the TPA decides to continue to do business with KCI, it should be in 
a different format.54
Additionally, DeMoulin gave notice to KCI of his intent to terminate the Consulting 
Agreement.55  Subsequently, DeMoulin executed a Contract Agreement with TPA, in 
which “he agreed to ‘research and develop a complete personalized reader program for 
kindergarten children specifically for the TPA to include a personalized Reader [and] a 
Curriculum Planner for Teachers.’”56  “No one from KCI was advised of the TPA owned 
personalized reader until it was approved by TPA . . . .”57  KCI sued TPA claiming 
breach of contract (the Partnership Agreement) and breach of fiduciary duty, and KCI 
sued DeMoulin claiming breach of contract (the Consulting Agreement) and breach of 
 
52 Id. (quoting the Confidentiality provision of the Consulting 
Agreement). 
53 See id. at 13-14. 
54 Id. at 14.  In fact, TPA and KCI entered into a Service Agreement 
after the partnership was terminated.  “The Service Agreement was 
characterized as a ‘customer-vendor/supplier relationship,’ with TPA as 
customer and KCI as the vendor/supplier.”  Id. at 15-16. 
55 Id. at 14.  DeMoulin advised KCI of his intent to terminate the 
Consulting Agreement, except for portions that related to payments to 
him.  Id. at 15.  However, two weeks later, DeMoulin “requested to keep 
his Consulting Agreement with KCI in place, stating that he had acted 
on bad advice from his lawyer, who was an ‘idiot.’”  Id. 
56 Id. at 15. (quoting the Contract Agreement between DeMoulin and TPA). 
57 Id. at 16.  TPA approved its reader nine months after TPA gave notice 
of its intent to terminate the KCI-TPA Partnership Agreement. 
  
                                                
fiduciary duty.  DeMoulin counterclaimed alleging defamation.58 This paper will only 
examine the breach of contract claims regarding the KCI-TPA Partnership Agreement. 
 
2. Ruling and Reasoning 
The District Court, applying Kansas law,59 did not prevent defendant TPA from 
terminating the Partnership Agreement.60  KCI alleged TPA breached the termination 
clause, TPA’s implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and the “related product” 
provision.61  The termination provision of the Partnership Agreement stated:  “The 
partnership can be dissolved with written notification of either party to the other within 
60 written days of July 30 each year.”62  The parties contended that there was ambiguity 
regarding the termination date and that the clause was ambiguous as to whether 
termination could be done without cause.63  The court recalled its previous ruling that 
there was no ambiguity regarding the termination date, and the court ruled that “the 
termination clause includes an unambiguous reservation by both parties of discretion to 
terminate the agreement.”64  KCI tried to submit an affidavit of one of its officers that 
stated that he believed the Partnership Agreement “could only be terminated for cause in 
 
58 Id. at 47.  This counterclaim was based on a KCI officer’s statements 
to DeMoulin’s boss that DeMoulin was a plagiarist.  DeMoulin asserted 
that a finding of no copyright infringement means that no plagiarism 
occurred.  Id.  The court disagreed.  See id. at 49. 
59 The parties agreed that Kansas law applied to contractual 
interpretation.  Id. at 18-19.  On the fiduciary duty claims, the court 
applied the Uniform Partnership Act and common law.  See id. at 16-18, 
30, 34. 
60 Id. at 49.  The case was on motion for summary judgment.  The opinion 
denied the parties’ motions.  Id. at 2-3. 
61Id. at 18, 21-29.   KCI also alleged another breach of contract claim, 
TPA’s “failure to distribute.”  However, KCI did not include this claim 
in the Pretrial Order, although TPA included the issue in its 
affirmative defenses.  The court held that KCI waived this claim.  See 
id. at 28-30. 
62 Id. at 21. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 22. 
  
                                                
order to secure the long term nature of the parties’ relationship.”65  However, applying 
established contract law principles, the court excluded the extrinsic evidence.  “Such 
evidence is inadmissible given the Court’s finding that the termination clause is 
unambiguous.”66  Since there was no express requirement of cause to terminate the 
Partnership Agreement, the termination clause would not prevent TPA from terminating 
the partnership. 
KCI alleged a breach of TPA’s implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, 
“which Kansas courts have followed the trend of implying in almost every contract.”67  
The court ruled that “[t]he concept of good faith becomes irrelevant in the interpretation 
of a contractual provision which grants ‘uncontrolled discretion’ to one of the parties.  
Because the termination clause gave the parties the right to terminate the Partnership 
Agreement without cause, KCI is precluded from contending that it had a reasonable 
expectation of any implied protection with respect to termination.”68  TPA would not be 
held to owe a duty of good faith and fair dealing to KCI with regard to termination, so no 
such duty prevented TPA from terminating the partnership as it wished.69   
KCI also alleged TPA breached the “related product” provision of the Partnership 
Agreement which stated:   
 
65 Id. at 22, note 30. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 23 (footnote omitted). 
68 Id. (footnote omitted). 
69 However, the court agreed with KCI that the implied duty of good 
faith and fair dealing remained in effect as to the provisions of the 
contract relating to performance.  Id. at 24.  “KCI contends that TPA 
breached its implied duty by ‘secretly’ developing [its own program] 
and contracting with DeMoulin prior to termination of the Partnership 
Agreement.”  Id.  The court held that that issue remained a question of 
fact to be decided by the jury.  Id. 
  
                                                
KCI is the owner and copyright [sic] holder of the “I Like Me!” reader and 
teachers guide.  Any “I Like Me!” related product or service created by 
Pioneers will be approved by KCI prior to promotion or distribution. . . . 
KCI will be responsible for the development of any new products under 
the “I Like Me!” program.70   
KCI asserted that TPA breached the contract “by developing and promoting a competing 
product which was ‘related’ to the ILM program without informing KCI of its intentions 
and efforts or seeking KCI’s consent as required by the Partnership Agreement.”71  TPA 
developed a personalized reader and program called “A Book About Me.”72  The court 
decided the issues of whether the “related product” provision was ambiguous, whether 
TPA’s own program was a “related product or service” to the ILM program, and at what 
time KCI’s approval was required.73  The court held that the term “related product”, as 
used in the Partnership Agreement was ambiguous, and it held that extrinsic evidence 
was admissible to determine the parties’ intent.74  Additionally, the court held that 
whether TPA’s own program qualified as a related product of the ILM program was 
ambiguous.  The court decided it was unclear whether TPA’s program was a “new 
product” for whose “development” KCI was responsible.  Further, the court held that 
there were “issues of material fact concerning TPA’s progress and intent with respect to 
the program.”75   
 
 
70 Id. at 25. 
71 Id. 
72 See id. at 13.  TPA developed “A Book About Me” with DeMoulin at a 
time when DeMoulin was still bound by his Consulting Agreement with KCI 
and when TPA was still bound by its Partnership Agreement with KCI. 
73 Id. at 26. 
74 Id. at 27. 
75 Id. at 28. 
  
3. Principles 
Kindergartners Count applied basic principles of contract law to decide whether 
to prevent termination and to interpret a “related product” provision.  In summary, if a 
contract unambiguously allows termination without cause, a party cannot introduce 
evidence of a cause requirement.  If a party can terminate the agreement without cause, 
that party does not owe a duty of good faith and fair dealing to the other party.  Whether a 
party breached an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing by secretly developing a 
competing product and contracting with the other party’s independent contractor prior to 
termination of the Partnership Agreement is a question of fact for the jury.  Since the 
term “related product” is ambiguous, it is a question of material fact whether one party’s 
program was a related product or service to the partnership’s program, requiring the other 
party’s approval. 
C. Termination Due to Failure to Generate Sufficient Income or Revenue  
In Data Marketing Co. of Virginia v. United States, a JV parent who was party to 
two JVAs terminated both of them due to failure of one or both of the related JVs to 
generate revenue.76  Plaintiff Data Marketing Co. of Virginia (“DMC”), Intessera 
Technologies Group, Inc. (“ITG”), and defendant National Technology Information 
Service (“NTIS”) entered into one JVA;77 Plaintiff Standard Development Association, 
Inc. (“SDA”) and defendant NTIS entered into another one.  The same man, Barry 
Nelsen, owned and operated DMC, ITG’s parent, and SDA.  NTIS is an agency within 
                                                 
76 See Data Marketing Co. of Virginia v. United States, No. 00-595C, 
2003 U.S. Claims LEXIS 68 (Ct. Fed. Cl. Mar. 21, 2003). 
77 The original parties were DMC, Western Technologies Communications, 
Inc. (“WTCI”), and NTIS.  ITG was a wholly-owned subsidiary of WTCI 
which took WTCI’s place in the JV.  ITG had developed the “SpecFinder” 
program for WTCI.  Id. at 11. 
  
                                                
the U.S. Department of Commerce.  The purpose of the JVs was “to provide the public 
with procurement-related data from the Department of Defense.”78  The subject of the 
DMC-ITG-NTIS JVA was entitled Technical Data Package Management Information 
System (“TDPMIS”);79 the subject of the SDA-NTIS JVA was named Industry Standards 
Repository and Distribution Network (“ISRDN”).80  The Department of Defense 
(“DOD”) supported NTIS’ efforts, as well as other approaches; DOD provided NTIS with 
initial start-up funding for TDPMIS.81
 
1. Claims 
NTIS sent termination letters to DMC, ITG, and SDA.82  NTIS attributed the 
terminations to lack of revenue and changed circumstances.  “Despite positive reviews of 
 
78 Id. at 1. 
79 NTIS was obligated to provide data, standards and drawings; ITG was 
responsible for software development and provision and for 
telecommunications support; DCM was responsible for marketing, planning 
and consulting with respect to TDPMIS.  See id. at 12-13. 
80 NTIS was required to provide facilities and technical expertise to 
store and access the ISRDN database; SDA was responsible for making 
contact with representatives of Standard Development Organizations 
(“SDOs”), from whom NTIS obtained non-governmental standards which 
would be posted on SpecFinder, for establishing distribution 
agreements, and for providing customer relations with SDO 
representatives.  See id. at 6-7, 9-10. 
81 See id. at 5-6. 
82 The termination clause in Paragraph 5.2 provided: 
“This agreement may be terminated: 
(a) by any Party upon at least five days’ [sic] advance written notice 
to the other Parties, given at any time prior to the commencement of 
the Operational Phase; 
(b) by any Party, upon at least 180 days’ [sic] advance written notice 
to the other Parties, given at any time following commencement of the 
Operational Phase; 
(c) by any Party, immediately upon written notice to the other Parties, 
if either of the other Parties shall have failed to perform any of its 
material covenants or obligations under this Agreement, or if any of 
the representations or warranties of the other in this Agreement fail 
to be true and correct in any material respect, and such failure shall 
have continued for a period of thirty days after written notice thereof 
given by the terminating Party.”  Id. at 15-16. 
  
                                                
TDPMIS, NTIS ultimately decided that it could not continue to support a project that was 
not creating revenue.”83  An NTIS officer stated that “‘it was decided that [NTIS] would 
terminate because there was no chance of [TDPMIS] becoming a commercially-viable 
program.’”84  NTIS’ termination letter to DMC and ITG indicated an intent to terminate 
in thirty days and stated that “‘the environment for delivering procurement-related 
technical data has changed dramatically and many of the original assumptions are simply 
no longer valid.’”85  The letter also made provision for the non-terminating party to 
continue under the JVA, as authorized by that agreement, should it want to continue the 
project.86  In ITG’s response to NTIS’ termination letter, ITG contended that the JVA 
required a longer termination period and expressed concern about “DOD’s other 
programs offering the same information ‘which has resulted in establishing a competitive 
role for the TDPMIS project.’”87   
DMC and SDA sued the United States.  DMC argued that “DOD breached 
DMC’s [JVA] by (a) supporting Procurement Gateway to compete with TDPMIS, (b) 
intentionally withholding data feeds from DOD to TDPMIS, and (c) directing NTIS to 
terminate the DMC [JVA].”88  DMC also claimed that NTIS breached the JVA.89  DMC 
argued that DOD and NTIS breached fiduciary duties owed DMC.90  Finally, DMC made 
 
83 Id. at 26. 
84 Id. at 28.  NTIS was required by legislation to be “substantially 
self-sustaining.”  Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 29.  Section 5.3 of the DMC-ITG-NTIS JVA contained the 
Continuation clause.  Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 37. 
89 Id. at 57. 
90 Id. at 59. 
  
                                                
third-party beneficiary claims.91  SDA claimed that NTIS breached the JVA and breached 
its fiduciary duty.  DMC demanded “loss of profits, costs incurred and misappropriation 
of intellectual property in the amount of [$20,774,129].”92  SDA demanded “loss of 
profits and costs incurred in the amount of [$7,639,442].”93  This paper will only examine 
DMC’s breach of contract claim against DOD, DMC’s breach of fiduciary duty claims 
against DOD and NTIS, and SDA’s breach of contract claim against NTIS. 
 
2. Ruling and Reasoning 
The United States Court of Federal Claims did not stand in the way of defendant’s 
terminating the JVAs:  The court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment and 
denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.94  As for DMC’s breach of contract 
claim against DOD, the court ruled that DOD was not a party to the DMC JV, so it could 
not be liable for breaching an agreement to which it was not a party.95   
It is well-settled that in order to sue the government for breach of contract 
the contractor must show that it is in privity with the breaching party.  In 
addition, it is equally well-settled that a contract with one agency of the 
United States is not a contract with any other agency of the United States.96
Nevertheless, the court ruled in the alternative that, even if DOD were deemed to be a 
party to the DMC JVA, DOD did not breach the JVA.97   
 
91 Id. at 60-61. 
92 Id. at 35.  The court entered summary judgment against DMC on the 
intellectual property claim because it considered DMC to have conceded 
that claim.  Id. at 35, note 10. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 70. 
95 See id. at 37. 
96 Id. at 37-38 (citations omitted). 
97 Id. at 42. 
  
                                                
First, DOD did not breach any agreement by supporting Procurement Gateway to 
compete with TDPMIS.   
An examination of the [JVA] reveals that the government did not promise 
DMC that it would not invest in or support other government operated 
web-based procurement information systems.  To the contrary, . . . the 
government made it clear from the outset that DOD was developing and 
supporting other web-based procurement information systems.  Absent an 
agreement from DOD not to support other web-based systems, DMC’s 
contention that DOD breached the DMC [JVA] is unfounded.98
Second, DOD did not breach the JVA by failing to provide data feeds to NTIS.  The JVA 
includes an express “Limitation of Liability” clause regarding each party’s obligations.99  
The clause states, in all capital letters:  “NEITHER ITG NOR NTIS SHALL HAVE 
ANY LIABILITY OR OBLIGATION WHATSOEVER FOR ANY FAILURE, 
OUTAGE OR INTERRUPTION OF THE ITG SYSTEM OR NTIS SYSTEM OR THE 
DATA CIRCUITS ON WHICH THE . . . DATA IS TRANSMITTED . . . .”100  The court 
held that “the contract precludes a finding of liability for any failure in connection with 
the receipt of data.  Because DMC’s claim rests on its contention that DOD interrupted 
the data feeds, its claim is barred by the contract.”101   
Third, DOD did not breach the JVA by impermissibly directing NTIS to terminate 
TDPMIS in an effort to deprive DMC of its JV profits.102  The court started out by 
clarifying semantics:  “The government did not terminate TDPMIS, it withdrew its 
 
98 Id. at 42-43. 
99 Id. at 46. 
100 Id. at 47 (quoting DCM/ITG/NTIS Joint Venture Agreement 8). 
101 Id. (footnote omitted). 
102 Id. at 51. 
  
                                                
support from the program.”103  NTIS allowed DMC to continue under the JVA should it 
wish to carry on the project,104 but the JVA did give each of the parties the right to 
withdraw from TDPMIS.105  All the party had to do was provide notice.  “DOD had no 
obligation to support TDPMIS for any period of time.  Since it is not disputed that the 
government gave DMC the requisite notice, it fulfilled its obligations under the 
[JVA].”106  DOD did not have to discuss its decision to withdraw in advance of giving 
notice, and nothing in the agreement required cooperation.107  The termination clause 
permitted a party to abandon its responsibilities for any reason.  Nevertheless, “to the 
extent there is any doubt that the government’s motives in deciding to withdraw from the 
[JV] was [sic] to harm DMC, the reasons provided by . . . the head of NTIS . . . remove 
any doubt. . . .  [The NTIS head] justified his decision to withdraw from TDPMIS on the 
grounds that TDPMIS was not financially viable.”108
The court dismissed DMC’s breach of fiduciary duty claims against DOD and 
NTIS.  DMC claimed that the government breached its fiduciary duty to DMC under the 
JVA by failing to disclose its commitment to Procurement Gateway and to be entirely 
loyal to the JVs’ purpose.109   
Ordinarily, joint venturers are considered “partners” and as “partners” owe 
each other certain fiduciary duties.  [However], the DMC [JVA] expressly 
states that the joint venturers are not partners:  “Nothing in this Agreement 
 
103 Id. at 52. 
104 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
105 Data Marketing Co., 2003 U.S. Claims LEXIS 68 at 52.  The court noted 
that this right to withdraw marked the difference between the JVA and a 
contract by the government for goods and services which is subject to 
traditional government contract principles.  Id. 
106 Id. at 54 (footnotes omitted). 
107 Id. at 54, note 18. 
108 Id. at 55. 
109 Id. at 59. 
  
                                                
constitutes or shall be construed to constitute any of the Parties as partners, 
and none of the Parties shall have any power or authority to bind the other 
or others in any respect.”  . . . [T]he parties altered the normal joint venture 
obligations and provided that they would not owed any fiduciary duty to 
each other.110
Because of the plain language of the contract, the court could not read partnership or 
fiduciary obligations into the JVA and therefore held that neither NTIS nor DOD 
breached any fiduciary duty owed DMC.   
As for SDA’s breach of contract claim against NTIS, the court held that NTIS did 
not breach the termination provisions of the SDA JVA.111  NTIS notified the Standard 
Development Organizations (“SDOs”),112 with whom NTIS had licensing agreements, 
that it was terminating its participation in ISRDN.113  SDA argues that, rather than 
terminating the license agreements, NTIS should have transferred them to SDA, and SDA 
argued that its agreement with NTIS prohibited NTIS from taking “unilateral action that 
might undermine ISRDN, including notifying SDOs of NTIS’ decision to withdraw from 
ISRDN.”114  Additionally, SDA alleged that NTIS’ actions prevented SDA from 
informing the SDOs of NTIS’ successor to take over the database and web page; SDA 
claimed that it was entitled to cooperation from NTIS in implementing a succession 
plan.115  In response, the government did not dispute that SDA informed NTIS of its 
desire to continue ISRDN, but the government argued that SDA never identified, within 
 
110 Id. at 59-60 (quoting DCM/ITG/NTIS Joint Venture Agreement 8) 
(citations omitted). 
111 Id. at 65. 
112 See supra note 80. 
113 Data Marketing Co., 2003 U.S. Claims LEXIS 68 at 65. 
114 Id. at 65-66. 
115 Id. at 66. 
  
                                                
sixty days after notice of withdrawal, a designated party who would succeed NTIS.116  
The court agreed with the government that SDA was obligated to identify a party with 
whom NTIS could work during the 120 days provided for a transition.117  “Without a 
designation, the government argues that NTIS had no obligation to continue to assist 
SDA in a transition and was free to serve notice . . . on the SDOs of NTIS’ intention of 




Data Marketing Co. applied basic contract law principles to decide whether to 
prevent termination of the JVA and of related licenses and to interpret contract clauses 
dealing with termination, withdrawal, continuation, and limitation of liability, among 
others.  In summary, in the case of a JV with the government, the other party must be in 
privity with the breaching party in order to sue.  If one party makes it clear from the 
outset that it is developing and supporting IP projects that compete with the JV, the other 
party cannot sue absent an agreement that the first party would not support competing 
projects.  If the parties to the JVA provided that they would not owe fiduciary duties to 
each other, then a party has not breached a fiduciary duty by failing to disclose its 
commitment to a competing project.  Where continuation under a JVA is allowed, a party 
must comply with the transition clause in order to argue that the other party is obligated 
to assist the first party with transition.  One JV party who has license agreements with a 
 
116 Id.  Section 6(d) of the SDA JVA states:  “In the event that either 
party withdraws from the [JV], the withdrawing party will cooperate in 
the transition of its respective responsibilities to a designated 
party.  Transition will be accomplished within 120 days after 60 days 
written notice.”  Id. 
117 Id. at 67. 
118 Id. at 66-67. 
  
                                                
third party may terminate those licenses, rather than transferring them to the second JV 
party, if the second party has not designated a successor to the first party in compliance 
with the transition clause. 
IV. Post-Termination  
Upon termination of an intellectual property JV, what happens to the IP, both that 
of the parents and that of the JV?  The parents have many contractual options to provide 
for the IP upon termination. A parent’s IP might be governed by agreements separate 
from the JVA, for example, license agreements between the parent and a third party or 
between the parent and the JV.  A parent can either terminate its licenses to third parties, 
or it can transfer them to the other JV parent.119  As for a parent’s licenses to the JV, the 
parent can terminate the licenses so that the IP rights revert to the parent, or the IP rights 
could continue with the JV.120  However, the JVA determines the destination of the JV’s 
IP, which means the parties should have contracted in advance to allocate IP created 
during the course of the JV project.  The JV’s IP might be in the form of copyrights, 
patents, or licenses; or the value of the IP might be represented in the goodwill or equity 
of the JV.                                                          
The JVA should specifically allocate rights to the JV’s IP when the IP is not 
easily divisible.  Theatrical collaboration JVAs contain detailed language regarding 
copyright ownership upon termination of the collaboration.121  The contract language of a 
 
119 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 114 (regarding NTIS’ licenses 
to the SDOs). 
120 See, e.g., supra note 86 and accompanying text (regarding 
continuation of TDPMIS). 
121 See M. Brannon Wiles, Do Theatrical Collaboration Agreements Create a 
Joint Venture?, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 219, 227 (2002) (analyzing key 
clauses of the Form of Collaboration Agreement used by the Dramatists 
Guild, Inc.). 
  
                                                
typical collaboration agreement states that the collaboration will not be deemed a “joint 
work.”122  This is a way to contract out of the statutory default of co-ownership of 
copyright in the work which gives the parents an undivided interest in the whole work.123  
Rather, copyright ownership reverts to the individual contributors upon termination.124  
“[T]he parties may choose to prohibit individual collaborators from using the elements 
[of the work that are not readily divisible], or they may provide that all collaborators may 
use the non-divisible elements freely.”125  However the parents wish to allocate the IP, 
they must do so in advance in the JVA. 
When the value of the IP is represented in the goodwill or equity of the JV, the 
parents can secure that value upon termination of the JVA.  One parent can buy out the 
other parent’s interest; both venturers can sell their interest to a third party; or the JV 
could liquidate and distribute its assets to the parents.126  In the case of one parent buying 
out the other parent’s interest, the parents could submit bids to each other until one ends 
up being the highest bidder.127  If there are many parents, they could hold an auction in 
which the partners bid for the offered interest.128  An agreement could provide that “a 
defined ‘nondefaulting party’ [would] have greater rights than a defined ‘defaulting 
party.’  For example, if a party becomes a defaulting party because it has gone into 
bankruptcy or has materially breached its covenants, then the nondefaulting party might 
have an option to purchase the defaulting party’s shares at a formula price . . . .”129  The 
 
122 See id. 
123 See id.  See generally 17 U.S.C.S. 201(a)(2003). 
124 Wiles, supra note 121, at 227. 
125 Id. 
126 See Hooton, supra note 17, at 1028. 
127 Id. at 1029. 
128 WOLF, supra note 12, at 259. 
129 Hooton, supra note 17, at 1028. 
  
JVA should specify the mechanism by which the parents can secure the value of the JV’s 
IP and should specify any related conditions. 
Conclusion 
 
JV parents must draft with an eye towards hostile termination and must account 
for post-termination issues.  If the parties have not planned for changed circumstances or 
expectations in their JVA, the courts will interpret the agreement according to established 
contract interpretation principles.  Courts more often than not will allow the parent who 
wants to terminate the JVA to do so, with little protection to the parent who wants to 
continue the JV.  This does not lead to the best disposition of the IP involved.  The parties 
should draft the JVA to provide for the JV’s IP upon termination, just in case one party 
wants to continue the JV after the other party terminates the JVA. 
